RECENT DEVELOPMENT S
FEDERAL PROCEDURE: COURT OF APPEALS DIRECTS
JUDGMENT ON MERITS FOR PLAINTIFF UPON
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

IT HAS NOW been established by Hurwitz v. Directors Guild' that
on an appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction the
appellate court may review the merits of the entire litigation and
direct entry of a final judgment for the plaintiff. The plaintiffs in
the instant case were members of a labor union which was in the
process of merging with the defendant-union. As a part of the agreement, the surviving union sought to impose upon the combined
membership its requirement that all members sign a non-communist oath. The plaintiffs, contending that the imposition of the oath
constituted an unreasonable criterion under New York common
law for expulsion from union membership and furthermore that the
oath was an unconstitutional condition upon such membership,
brought suit to direct the defendant to admit them as members in
good standing without regard to the oath. They also moved for a
preliminary injunction either delaying the merger pendente lite or
requiring the defendant to admit them to membership pending the
outcome of the litigation. The district court denied the motion,
and the plaintiffs appealed. Sidestepping the constitutional issue,
the court of appeals held that the loyalty oath was per se an unreasonable and unlawful requirement for union membership under
the common law of New York, and thereupon directed entry of a
final judgment on the merits for the plaintiff.
Generally upon appeal from an interlocutory order when permitted by section 1292 (a) (1) of the Judicial Code,2 the appellate
court will go no further into the merits than is necessary to decide
the propriety of the order supporting the appeal. 8 This rule is con1364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3201

(U.S. Dec. 5, 1966).
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1) (1964).
'E.g., United States v. Brown, 331 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1964); Flight Eng'rs Ass'n
v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 314 F.2d 500 (1963); Shearman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 250 F.2d 191 (8th Cir.
1957); Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc., v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949); Local 186, Food Workers Union v. Smiley,
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sistent with the precept that the district court need not consider the
case on its merits in order to determine if the movant is entitled
to preliminary relief.4 Since in many instances, therefore, the merits
have not been fully explored prior to the appeal, a policy decision
dictates that the appellate court should not consider any more than
is essential to decide the procedural motion, for to do otherwise
would be tantamount to rendering a decision without a full disclosure of the facts and legal arguments.5 Equally, the rule derives
from the desire to retain litigation in the district court until the
case has been fully heard by it in order to prevent a party from
securing a piecemeal trial as a delaying tactic or an advisory opinion
from the higher court.6
Nevertheless, under a well-established exception to the general
practice, an appellate court may reach the merits and direct a verdict for the defendant, thus dismissing the complaint, if its examination of the record upon an interlocutory appeal reveals that the
plaintiff's position is entirely devoid of merit. 7 The exception operates to permit the court to dismiss the complaint and thereby terminate the litigation upon review of the questions which are determinative of the order supporting the appeal.8 Similarly the court may
consider, upon an interlocutory appeal, a prior motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,9 or for lack of jurisdiction, 10 or for improper venue" when such inquiry will be dispositive of the action.
164 F. 2d 922 (3d Cir. 1947); Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 95 F.2d
Cir. 1938); see Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156, 162
'Barnwell Drilling Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 300 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); see
man v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 180 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1950); see also

Civ. P. 65. See generally 3
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§ 1433 (Wright ed. 1958, Supp. 1965).
"See Mesabi Iron Co. v. Reserve Mining Co., 270 F.2d 567, 570 (8th Cir. 1959);
Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., supra note 4, at 96.
6 Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., supra note 4.
7E.g., Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900); Smith v. Vulcan
Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897); Arizona Edison Co. v. Southern Sierras Power Co.,
17 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 757 (1927). See Meccano, Ltd. v. John
Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920); Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson,
242 F.2d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1957).
a6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.08[l] (2d ed. 1953); see Deckert v. Independence

Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Arizona Edison Co. v. Southern Sierras Power
Co., supra note 7.
o See Decker.t v. Independence Shares Corp., supra note 8, at 287; Greater Del.
Val. F.S. & L. Ass'n v. Federal Home L.B. Bd., 262 F.2d 371, 372 (3d Cir. 1958). But see,
e.g., Local 186, Food Workers Union v. Smiley, 164 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1947).
10 See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., supra note 8, at 287.

1 See Riverbank Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 220 F.2d 465, 466
(7th Cir.
1955), reid on other grounds, 350 U.S. 1003 (1956).
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Several tests have been proposed to determine when dismissal is
appropriate, including whether all issues can be disposed of at once
without injustice to the parties12 and whether the case involves a
question of triable fact. 13 While this power to dismiss the case on
the merits seems originally to have been assumed without explanation, 14 it was later justified as a means to conserve judicial time16
and by construction of the act allowing appeals from interlocutory
orders.' 6
The court recognized that Hurwitz is the first decision to permit
a judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiff upon an interlocutory appeal, a question upon which the Second Circuit previously had expressly refused to pass.' 7 It explained the failure of

any precedent by observing that very few cases present no question
of fact, and even fewer would warrant a judgment for the plaintiff
before a trial on the merits. The court, however, could find no
reason why the exercise of such power would be undesirable, especially since it secures economy of litigation. This goal, it noted, is
served as well when the court directs a verdict for the plaintiff as
when it does so for the defendant.
Even though the instant case theoretically extends the law to
allow an appellate court to direct the entry of a final judgment for
the plaintiff as well as the defendant, the practical and precedential
value of the decision is limited by the unique factual situation
which produced the result. No triable issue of fact was present,
and the application of the relevant legal principles to the defendant's required oath was seemingly clear. Thus the case was ripe
for the result actually reached. However, the policy supporting the
result, economy of litigation, must not be undervalued. The decision, as well as the analogous rule allowing appellate courts to
decide the merits in favor of the defendant, alleviates the necessity,
in appropriate cases, of repeated transfers of a case between the
district court and the court of appeals. Thus, although the Interlocutory Appeals Act 8 is actually an exception to the final judgment
12 Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 140 (1920).
13 Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 495 (1900).
USee Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 520 (1897).
15 Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 495 (1900).
18Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897).
17
Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 250 Fed. 250 (2d Cir. 1918), af'd, 253 U.S.

136 (1920).
1828 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
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rule,19 the judicial economy policy of the latter is being served by
intermediate appeals in conjunction with these court-made procedures which allow directed verdicts.
Although the holding of the Hurwitz case serves the function
of economy, the court failed to lay down a clear test to be used to
determine when the rule should be applied; however, it did intimate that the absence of any triable issue of fact is a major consideration. The court also suggested that the power to direct a
verdict must be exercised cautiously. This notion is supportable
because the paxticular procedural device in question is somewhat
more drastic than that allowing the appellate court to dismiss the
complaint. When the court decides on the merits in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff has at least filed his major pleading, the
complaint. The defendant, on the other hand, has not always filed
his answer before the interlocutory appeal is taken. 20 Thus the test
should be stringent, and a directed verdict for the plaintiff should
be permitted only in very rare cases, since the defendant is entitled
to his day in court if there is any possibility that he may offer a
meritorious defense. A seemingly workable standard, which incorporates the suggestion of the court in the instant case, would be
whether it is apparent from the record that there is no triable
issue of fact and that, on the facts as stated, any defense the defendant might raise would be clearly devoid of merit. Under the foregoing test, the salutary effect of the Second Circuit's formulation
may be realized without sacrificing justice to the defendant for the
mere convenience of the court.
1028 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
*0 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) with Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518

(1897). See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900).

